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CONSTITUTIONAL CHECKS ON COLLUSIVE
INVASION OF JURISDICTION IN
MATRIMONIAL ACTIONS
T HE INCREASING POPULARITY of the Virgin Islands as a
divorce haven1 and the legal problems connected therewith have
been discussed in the Spring, 1953, issue of this JOURNAL, ' where the
conclusion was drawn that "... those with Virgin Islands divorces
will be subject to the perils of shaky and uncertain marital status."13
The recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Alton v. Alton4 has done much to focus the attention of legal writers
once more on the thorny issue of migratory divorces; 5 and although the
United States Supreme Court disposed of that case by simply vacating
and remanding, it will come to grips with the issues involved in the
not too distant future.6
It is the purpose of this Comment to discuss, by adverting to the
Third Circuit's decision, the control exercised by the Federal Constitu-
tion over state and territorial power to grant divorces, and to draw
attention to a point likely to be of substantial importance in the future:
the yawning gap between the full faith and credit 7 and due process'
clauses.
'Cf. Meisel, A merica's New Divorce Haven, Reader's Digest, Jan. 1953, p. 1oz.
- Calloway, Legal Status of the Virgin Islands Divorces, 3 DUKE B.J. ioz (1953).
'Id. at 112. &2o7 F.zd 667 ( 3 d Cir. 1953).
'See Paulsen, The Power to Divorce-Two Legislative Acts, 4o A.B.A.J. 330
(1954) Comment, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 293 (1954) 5 Notes, 34 B.U.L. REV. z6 ('954),
54 COL. L. REV. 415 (1954.), 4z GEo. LJ. 450 (1954), ZZ GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 356
(x954-), 67 HARV. L. REV. 516 (954).
' In Alton v. Alton, 347 U.S. 61o (1954), the Supreme Court vacated the de-
cision below because respondent had in the meantime obtained a divorce elsewhere
and appellant had been a party to the latter proceeding. One month after the Supreme
Court's decision, a case which "is the same with regard to all operative facts and
principles of law" was decided in the same manner by the Third Circuit. Granville-
Smith v. Granville-Smith, 214 F.2d 82o ( 3 d Cir. 1954). Certiorari has been granted:
2z U.S.L. WEEK 3082 (1954.
7 U.S. CONST. ART. IV, § i: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
8 U.S. CONsT. AMEND. V: "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § i: ".. . Nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. . . ." For applicability see note 15 infra.
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The facts of the Alton case are as follows: After six weeks' residence
in the Virgin Islands, W, formerly domiciled in Connecticut, filed suit
for divorce against H, also domiciled in Connecticut. H entered ap-
pearance and waived service of summons without contesting W's allega-
tions. The commissioner to whom the case was referred recommended
that W be granted a divorce for "incompatibility of temperament." The
District Court for the Virgin Islands requested further proof of W's
domicile; none forthcoming, it denied the relief sought. W appealed,
contending that, in accordance with Virgin Islands law, the court had no
authority for further sua sponte inquiry. On appeal, H filed no brief
and made no argument. The district court's decision was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting in bane (4:3), and
the Virgin Islands statute on which W relied was held unconstitutional.
This statute was an amendment to Section 9 of the Virgin Islands
divorce law of 1944 which provided:
In an action for the dissolution of the marriage contract or for
legal separation the plaintiff therein must be an inhabitant of
the district at the commencement of the action for six weeks
prior thereto, which residence shall be sufficient to give the
Court jurisdiction without regard to the place where the marri-
age was solemnized or the cause of action arose.9
The words, "inhabitant" and "residence," having been held to mean
"domiciliary" and "domicile" by way of dictum,"0 the Legislative As-
sembly of the Virgin Islands" enacted the following amendment:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 8 and 9 hereof, if the
plaintiff is within the district at the time of the filing of the
complaint and has been continuously for six weeks immediately
prior thereto, this shall be prima facie evidence of domicile, and
where the defendant has been personally served within the dis-
trict or enters a general appearance in the action, then the Court
shall have jurisdiction of the action and the parties thereto with-
out further reference to domicile or to the place where the mar-
riage was solemnized or the cause of action arose.12
9 LAW CONCERNING ACTIONS To DECLARE VoID OR DISSOLVE THE MARRIAGE CON-
TRACT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES §9, approved December 29, 1944. The full text is
quoted in Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799, 8oz n. z (3 d Cir. 1957).
"oBurch v. Burch, 195 F.zd 799, 8o4 (3 d Cir. 1952).
"' Established pursuant to the Organic Act of June 22, 1936, 49 STAT. i8o6, 18o8-9
(1936), 48 U.s.C. § 14o5f (1948).
" Bill No. 55, Legislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands, approved May 29, 1953S
quoted in full in Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 669 ( 3 d Cir. i953).
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Both portions of this amendment appear to be applicable to Mrs.
Alton. Since she had been in the district for six weeks, she was en-
titled to the statutory presumption of being domiciled therein; and
since Mr. Alton had entered a general appearance in the action, the
court seemingly had jurisdiction of the action "without further refer-
ence to domicile." The reasons for the district court's denying W's
motion to confirm the findings of the commissioner that she be granted
a divorce are not quite clear but can possibly be gleaned from the fol-
lowing colloquy between the court and Mr. Dudley, W's counsel:
The Court: I have looked at the Transcript of the record here-
in and I would like to ask whether you have any more evidence
to offer on the question of domicile.
Mr. Dudley: No, sir.
The Court: It is my opinion, after examining the record, that
the proof herein is not sufficient to establish domicile in accord-
ance with the directive in the case of Burch v. Burch,'" decided
by the Court of Appeals of this Circuit.
Mr. Dudley: If your Honor please, our divorce law has been
amended as of May 29, 1953, and there is a new section 9a now
in effect which makes six weeks residence on the part of the
plaintiff prior to the filing of the complaint prima facie evidence
of domicile.
The Court: I have seen the new section and, as I said before,
I doubt whether it is sufficient to confer jurisdiction, and I will
have to deny your motion. The motion will therefore be denied
and the complaint will be dismissed.' 4
Judge Goodrich's opinion affirming the decision of the district court,
without offering reasons for the cavalier treatment of the 1953 amend-
ment by the latter, treats the amendment as consisting of two logically
distinct legal premises, and holds both to be unconstitutional as in con-
travention of the due process clauses of the Fifth Amendment and the
Virgin Islands Organic Act.' The legislative creation of a prima facie
presumption of domicile on the basis of six weeks' physical presence is
held to be unconstitutional as creating an unreasonable presumption
with respect to a jurisdictional fact; and the automatic conferring of
jurisdiction upon consent of the other party is treated as an unconstitu-
1 95 F.zd 799 ( 3 d Cir. 1952).
2 07 F.zd 667, 684 ( 3 d Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion of Judge Hastie).
"
5Act of June zz, 1936, 49 STAT. i8o6, i8z5 (936), 48 U.S.C. § 14o6g (1948).
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not applicable to the Virgin
Islands, since the Virgin Islands is no state. Cf. Alton v. Alton, 207 F.zd 667, 670
n. 8 (3d Cir. 1953).
1954]
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tional interference with the domiciliaries of other states. There are
thus two major issues: (I) whether the legislature can constitutionally
create a prima facie presumption of domicile on the basis of a specified
period of physical presence, assuming that domicile is a jurisdictional
fact in divorce cases;' 0 and (2) whether domicile of at least one of the
parties within the jurisdiction of the court granting the divorce really
is a constitutional requirement. This Comment is directed only to the
latter.
DOMICILE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL PREREQUISITE
OF DIVORCE JURISDICTION
It is ordinarily assumed that domicile of at least one party within
the jurisdiction of the court granting a divorce decree is a constitational
prerequisite for its validity, even within the jurisdiction of the court
granting it. As Judge Goodrich expressed it for the majority:
We think that the premise that divorce jurisdiction is founded
on domicile is still the law. It was reiterated in [Williams II1].
If that premise is to disappear in the light of real or supposed
change in social concepts, its disappearance should be the result
of higher authority than ours."'
It is submitted, however, that especially on the basis of recent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court, including the one relied on by
Judge Goodrich, it is by no means clear that divorce jurisdiction has to
be founded on domicile. A brief look at the Constitution and an analy-
sis of recent Supreme Court decisions in the field of migratory divorces
will disclose the reasons for this assertion.
Under the Constitution 9 and legislation enacted in accordance there-
with,20 judgments of the courts of states and territories21 of the Union
are entitled to full faith and credit throughout the United States. They
are only entitled to such full faith and credit, however, if granted by a
'L The first attempt to lay down a general test for determining whether a statute
making a fact presumptive evidence of another fact contravenes the due process clause
came in Mobile J. & K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (91o) (statute making
injury inflicted on persons by running locomotives or cars prima facie evidence of
negligence held to be constitutional). See generally 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2494
( 3 d ed. 1940); Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 CALIF. L. REv.
245 (I953); Note, 56 HARV. L. REv. 132 4 (1943).
"'The reference is to Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
See note 29 infra, and text at note 36.
207 F.2d 667, 676 ( 3 d Cir. x953).
'9 See note 7 supra.
2'28 U.S.C. § 1738 (Supp. 1952).
" The Virgin Islands is a territory, and the judgments of its courts are entitled to
full faith and credit not on the basis of the Constitution, but on the basis of the stat-
utory provision cited in note zo supra.
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court having jurisdiction over both the subject-matter and the parties.
If they meet these requirements, they must be given effect. That is the
purpose-and the only purpose-of the full faith and credit clause.22
Under the various due process clauses, however, judgments not accord-
ing procedural due process to both litigants are of no effect whatsover,
even in the state of rendition.23
It therefore appears to be at least logically possible that the two
provisions of the Constitution governing jurisdiction and judgments
within the Union are of entirely different scope and effect. The full
faith and credit clause determines when the decision of the court of a
sister state must be given effect; the due process clauses provide that all
judicial decisions contrary to due process are of no effect whatsoever.
But can a judgment, failing to meet the jurisdictional prerequisites of
full faith and credit, nevertheless measure up to the due process man-
dates of the Constitution? The text is silent. And up to the present,
the Supreme Court has decided only to what extent full faith and credit
must be accorded divorces granted by sister states; it has not decided
what types of divorce are invalid, even in the state of rendition.24
The question of full faith and credit has been involved in two
fundamentally different types of divorce: (i) the so-called "ex parte"
divorce, where only one party is subject to the personal jurisdiction of
the court granting the divorce, and the other is served by publication or
registered mail but does not appear or consent to service; and (2) what
herein will be called the "normal" divorce, where the court granting
the decree has personal jurisdiction over both parties.
With respect to ex parte divorces, the old, or Haddock,25 rule was
that such divorces were not entitled to recognition in sister states under
the full faith and credit clause. Such recognition could, nevertheless, be
extended as a matter of comity; and the divorce was valid within the
state of rendition.26  Thus, Mr. Haddock was single in Connecticut
" See Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287, 293-295 (1942); Williams
v. North Carolina (11), 325 U.S. z,6, 227-22 9 (1945).
"Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) ; International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 3o6
(195o).
1' See notes 33 to 42 infra and accompanying text.
"'Haddock v. Haddock, 2oi U.S. 562 (19o6).
20 Id. at 6o5-6o6: "Without questioning the power of the State of Connecticut to
enforce within its own borders the decree of divorce which is here in issue [granted
to a Connecticut domiciliary against a New York domiciliary without appearance by
the latter], and without intimating a doubt as to the power of the State of New York
to give a decree of that characater rendered in Connecticut, within the borders of the
State of New York and as to its own citizens, such efficacy as it may be entitled to in
view of the public policy of that State, we hold that the decree of the court of Con-
19541
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but married in New York; and Mrs. Haddock was in the same situation.
It might be questioned whether this result was intended;27 certainly,
there has hardly ever been a more universally disliked decision.2 It
has, however, been formally and expressis verbis overruled in the
memorable Williams cases,29 which hold that recognition on the basis
of the full faith and credit clause must be given to ex parte divorces of
sister states, provided that the party seeking the divorce is domiciled in
the granting state at the time of the rendition of the decree.30 But the
jurisdictional finding on which the decree is based (i.e., that plaintiff
is domiciled in the state where action is brought) is subject to collateral
attack; and if either the defendant3 ' or some other interested party "
succeeds in proving in the courts of another state that the plaintiff was
not domiciled in the granting state, the divorce decree will not be
entitled to recognition on the basis of the full faith and credit clause.
But what does this have to do with the validity of the decree as
such, or the law under which the decree was rendered? It is obvious
necticut rendered under the circumstances stated was not entitled to obligatory enforce-
ment in the State of New York by virtue of the full faith and credit clause."
2 See Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled?, I8 IND. L.J. 165 (1943), sug-
gesting that all Haddock was intended to establish was that while the civil status por-
tion of the marital union could be severed by a state having jurisdiction by virtue of
domicile over one party but no jurisdiction whatever over the other, the property,
or alimony, portion could not be so severed without jurisdiction over the party who
stood to lose by the divorce. This prophetic view is now law. See Estin v. Estin, 334
U.S. 54- (1948).
25 Dicey's note on the case starts as follows: "The profound respect rightly enter-
tained by all English lawyers for the Supreme Court of the United States makes it
impossible to read the full report of Haddock . . . with any other feeling than that of
sheer amazement." z2 L.Q. REv. 237 (x9o6). Beale ended his comment on it as
follows: "The decision then is opposed to reason, to authority, and to morality. ... 
He considered it worse than the Dred Scott or Legal Tender decisions. Beale, Consi-
tutional Protection of Decrees for Divorce, I9 HARv. L. REV. 586, 597 (9o6).
29 Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. ±87, 304 (942), reversing State
v. 0. B. Williams and Lillie Shaver Hendrix, zzo N.C. 445, 17 S.E.zd 769 (1941),
herein referred to as Williams I; Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (945),
affirming 224 N.C. 183, z9 S.E.zd 744 (944), herein Williams 1I. For an exhaustive
discussion, particularly of Williams 11, see Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 HARV. L.
REV. 930 945).
2o317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) (Williams I)3 325 U.S. 226, 229-230 (945)
(Willianzs II).
" Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rel. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279 (2945).
2 Thus, Williams II upheld the conviction for bigamous cohabitation of two parties
who, after leaving their respective spouses in North Carolina, where they had been
living, went to Nevada, obtained ex parte divorces, intermarried, and returned to North
Carolina. "The State of domiciliary origin should not be bound by an unfounded,
even if not collusive, recital in the record of a court of another State-" 325 U.S. 2z6,
230 (1945) (Williams 11).
[VCol. 4: 55
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that if a decree is entitled to full faith and credit, it is not in violation
of the due process clauses. The Constitution will not order what the
Constitution forbids. But does it follow that a decree not entitled to
recognition on the basis of the full faith and credit clause in sister states
is also void as in violation of the due process clauses, ergo void even in
the state of rendition? There are strong hints in recent decisions that
the answer is in the negative.
Invalidity throughout the United States, in the opinion of Judge
Goodrich, 33 follows from the plain statement of the Supreme Court in
the second Williams case that
Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce-
jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on domicil. The
framers of the Constitution were familiar with this jurisdictional
prerequisite, and since 1789 neither this Court nor any other
court in the English-speaking world has questioned it.3 4
Leaving aside for a moment severe doubts as to the historical ac-
curacy of that statement,35 one cannot help noticing two things. First,
Williams 11 merely involved the full faith and credit, and not the
due process, clause. Second, the portion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
opinion quoted above by no means represents the view of the majority
of the Supreme Court, even in the second Williams case. The con-
curring opinion, equally supported by three Justices, bluntly states:
The State of Nevada had unquestioned authority, consistent with
procedural due process, to grant divorces on whatever basis it
sees fit to all who meet its statutory requirements. It is entitled,
"Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 676 ( 3 d Cir. 1953).
34 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
"' See the dissenting opinion of Hastie, J., in the Alton case, 207 F.zd 667, 68i-z
( 3 d Cir. 1953) i also Cook, op. cit. si pra note 27, at 166-i69. A thorough historical
study of the subject is still lacking, but it might be pointed out that Scots courts have
granted a series of divorces in the i 9 th century merely on the basis of adultery having
been committed in Scotland, and in the absence of domicile of either party. ERSKINE,
INSTITUTE OF THE LAw OF SCOTLAND 137 n. i (revised ed. 1838), while English
courts have, on the basis of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, at least up to 1878
granted divorces to residents who were not domiciliaries. See Niboyet v. Niboyet, 4
P.D. x (C.A. 1878), reversing Phillimore's judgment below, 3 P.D. 52 (1878). The
rule conditioning divorce upon domicile was not established firmly until the decision of
the Privy Council in Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier, [1895] A.C. 517 (P.C.). Curiously
enough, Dicey's 1896 edition states the law of England to be substantially unsettled on
this point, although the author admittedly adheres to the domicile theory. DIcNy,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 269-276; 753-759 (Am. ed. by Moore 1896). For a recent
broadside attack on Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statement quoted in text at note 34, see
David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, x29 N.Y.S.2d 649, 653-654 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
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moreover, to give its divorce decrees absolute and binding finality
within its borders.
But if Nevada's divorce decrees are to be accorded full faith
and credit in the courts of her sister states it is essential that
Nevada have proper jurisdiction over the divorce proceedings.
This means that at least one of the parties to each ex parte pro-
ceeding must have a bona fide domicile within Nevada for what-
ever length of time Nevada may prescribe.3"
The two dissenting opinions, particularly that of Mr. Justice Rutledge,
also point out that even Mr. Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion
does not hold that the decree, successfully impeached on jurisdictional
grounds in North Carolina for the purpose of refusing it full faith and
credit there, is, therefore, void in Nevada.38 Consequently, it appears
that Williams II does not hold that a divorce granted in the absence of
jurisdiction over at least one of the parties based on domicile is void
even in the state of rendition. This conclusion, at least so far as its
present importance is concerned, is fortified both by the fact that Mr.
Justice Frankfurter's position, quoted above, has forced him into the
minority in subsequent cases,30 and by the fact that the decision he pri-
marily relies on has later been expressly overruled.40  Thus, it might
easily be concluded that, even absent any parallel trend in the field of
"normal" divorces, the Supreme Court would, if squarely faced with
the question, hold that a divorce not grounded on jurisdiction by virtue
of domicile over at least one of the parties, while not entitled to full
faith and credit in sister states, is nevertheless valid in the state of rendi-
tion. This has been the express conclusion of the Seventh Circuit; 41
and the Supreme Court, while reversing that decision on other grounds,
has not seen fit to disaffirm it.42
A brief look into the field of "normal" divorces (i.e., where the
court granting the decree has personal jurisdiction over both parties) will
show that in this field, at least, domicile of one of the parties within the
36 325 U.S. 226, 239 (945).
7 Id. at 244.
38 See also Black, J., dissenting, id. at 261, 262.
'DCf. his dissent in Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 356-377 (1948).
40Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); cf. Sherrer v. Sherrer, stipra note 39
at 352-353.
"'Sutton v. Leib, i88 F.zd 766, 768 (th Cir. 195): "We have searched the
numerous cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on the subject of
migratory divorce for a definitive holding as to the judicial status of such divorce in
the state that decreed it. It appears to be assumed that the decree is valid and binding
in the state where it was rendered."
2 2Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952).
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jurisdiction of the court granting the decree is not even a prerequisite
for clothing that decree with effectiveness on the basis of the full faith
and credit clause. The Supreme Court has long held that where a party
to a divorce proceeding unsuccessfully contests the jurisdiction of the
court where action is brought, he is bound by the determination of the
court that it has jurisdiction and cannot later attack the decree col-
laterally. 3 One might think that this is only true where two basic
conditions are met: (i) if the law of the state granting the divorce
actually requires that at least one of the parties be domiciled within its
borders; and (2) where there is an actual contentious proceeding in-
volving the fact of such domicile. Then the issue involved would be a
jurisdictional fact, and since there must be an end to litigation some-
where, there could be little objection against making the court's de-
termination that it has jurisdiction binding upon the parties and those
in privity with them.4' But the Supreme Court has not remained within
such narrow bounds. It has held that all divorce decrees granted by the
courts of sister states are, if the other party as much as appeared by
counsel, entitled to recognition under the full faith and credit clause.45
Of course, the parties themselves are estopped from impeaching the de-
cree on jurisdictional grounds in collateral proceedings, but even persons
not party to the proceedings nor in privity with them are so barred,
and this in cases where the record indicates lack of domicile of plaintiff
so dearly that to question the spuriousness of it would be an insult to
adult intelligence. 6
When a divorce cannot be attacked for lack of jurisdiction by
parties actually before the court or strangers in the rendering
" Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938).
"Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525-526 (1931):
"Public policy dictates that there be an end to litigation; that those who have contested
an issue shall be bound by the result of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be
considered forever settled between the parties. We see no reason why this doctrine
should not apply in every case where one voluntarily appears, presents his case and is
fully heard, and why he should not, in the absence of fraud, be thereafter concluded by
the judgment of the tribunal to which he has submitted his cause?' See also Treinies
v. Sunshine Milling Co., 308 U.S. 66, 78 (1939).
"Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 1z6 (19si), reversing 117 Vt. 173, 86 A.zd 923
(95s2); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (x95i)5 Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378
(1948) 5 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 3 3 US. 343 (1948) 5 see also Drinkwater v. Drinkwater,
III F.Supp. 559 (D.D.C. '953)-
"'In Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 136 (1951), H-2 found out that there was an H-r
living. He thereupon sent W to Florida to get a divorce from H-z, paying her ex-
penses. W obtained the divorce and returned to H-2 who thereupon remarried her.
Since H-i had appeared in the Florida action, the end result is that the divorce and
the second marriage are both good. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's acid dissent, 342
U.S. 126, 129-133 (1951).
1954]
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state, it cannot be attacked by them anywhere in the Union. The
Full Faith and Credit Clause forbids.4
Applying the doctrines of the Supreme Court with respect to both
types of divorces to the Virgin Islands statute held unconstitutional, one
cannot help observing two things: (i) If an ex parte divorce were
granted under the first portion of Section 9a, making six weeks' physical
presence in the Virgin Islands prima fade evidence of domicile, it would
be subject to collateral attacks in other jurisdictions, since, under the rule
of Williams 1, the jurisdictional finding in an ex parte divorce is sub-
ject to collateral attack.48 Even if successfully attacked, however, the di-
vorce would still be valid in the Virgin Islands. Since valid there, it
cannot be unconstitutional under due process. (2) If, on the other
hand, a divorce is granted under the second portion of the statute (re-
quiring appearance of the other party), then the decree will be as in-
vulnerable throughout the United States as can possibly be desired, not
being subject to collateral attack anywhere else by anyone not entitled
to attack it collaterally in the Virgin Islands. The curious result is that
in the Alton case, where both H and W were subject to the jurisdiction
of the court in which the divorce proceedings were brought, a different
decision on the district court level would have produced an ironclad
decree, safe even from the paternal control of the Third Circuit, since
obviously neither party would have appealed. Since a statute under
which valid decisions can be rendered is not unconstitutional, it is sub-
mitted that the Third Circuit's decision in Alton v. Alton was not cor-
rect.
CONSEQUENCES
If, however, the Supreme Court had upheld the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit without substantially modifying
it, it is submitted that the divorce laws and decrees of several states
would also have been subject to grave constitutional attack. Take,
for instance, the laws of the two primary "havens" for migratory
divorces, Florida and Nevada. Florida merely provides that ". ..in
order to obtain a divorce the complainant must have resided ninety
days in the State of Florida before filing the bill of complaint."40 When
the Governor signed the law reducing residence requirements from
one year to three months and enacting the provision quoted, he declared:
Florida is a transient state, extending to the people of the United
States an invitation to come here as visitors and remain as resi-
"'Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 589 (95).
"8 For a successful attack on an ex parte Virgin Islands divorce, see Bean v. Bean,
95 N.Y.S.zd 477 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
"'FLA. STAT. § 65.02 (94 ).
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dents. If this bill brings additional residents or visitors to
Florida, it will be in line with that invitation (emphasis added).50
Nevada assumes jurisdiction to grant divorces if "plaintiff shall have
resided six weeks in the state before suit is brought."'" Neither statute
contains the slightest reference to "domicile;" but appellate courts have
generally held that mere sojourn for the purpose of obtaining a divorce
supposedly is not sufficient.5 * Thus, "residence," as used in the statutes
quoted above, has come to mean "legal residence," but not necessarily
domicile. Furthermore, standards for the establishment of legal resi-
dence for divorce purposes are somewhat lax both in Florida and in
Nevada. (The Supreme Court of Florida has said, "After all, the best
proof of one's domicile is where he says it is." 5 3) It might also be
pointed out that the peculiar feature of ex parte divorces is that they do
not, as a rule, become subject to appeal in the state of rendition, so that
even state supreme courts' interpretation of statutory jurisdictional pre-
requisites will not necessarily be followed. The following testimony,
for instance, sufficed to establish Mrs. Hendrix's legal residence in Ne-
vada for the purpose of obtaining her ill-fated divorce enabling her to
marry Mr. Williams of Williams I and I1 fame:
Q. [by her counsel] Where do you reside?
A. Las Vegas, Nevada.
Q. Las Vegas, Clark County, Nevada?
A. Yes.
Q. You filed your complaint on June 26th, 194o, had you re-
sided here a full six weeks prior to that time?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you come to Clark County, Nevada?
A. May 15, 1940.
Q. What was your object and intention in coming here at that
time?
A. To establish a residence.
"Quoted by Willock, Historical Review of the Divorce Laws of Florida, 5 FLA.
STAT. ANN. 531, 541 (x943).
"x NFv. CoMp. L., SuPP. 1931-1941 § 9460.
'2 Kutner v. Kutner, 159 Fla. 870, 873-4, 33 So.2d 42 (1947) and cases there
citedi in the Kutner case the Supreme Court of Florida reversed a circuit court "mail
order" divorce decree. See also Blouin v. Blouin, 67 Nev. 314, 218 P.2d 937 (.950) 5
Latterner v. Latterner, 51 Nev. 285, 274 Pac. z94 (1929) 5Lewis v. Lewis, 5o Nev.
419, 264 Pac. 981 (i928); Presson v. Presson, 38 Nev. 203, 147 Pac. iogi (1915).
For historical background, see In re Schnitzler, 33 Nev. 581, 112 Pac. 848 (i915), and
Ingram and Ballard, The Business of Migratory Divorce in Nevada, 2 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 302 0935).
"Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 609, 33 So.2d 870, 873 (1947).
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Q. Did you establish a residence?
A. Yes.
Q. And that residence was an indefinite permanent residence?
(Emphasis added.)
A. Yes.
She also testified that she had not been absent for a twenty-four hour
period during the time specified, and that she lived at the Alamo Court,
apparently a motel. There was no cross-examination . 4
A cursory check of annotations of the full faith and credit clause
will demonstrate the well-known fact that most divorce decrees suc-
cessfully impeached collaterally in other states for lack of jurisdiction
in the granting state were granted by Florida and Nevada. If one were
to follow Judge Goodrich's view that the due process and full faith
and credit clauses are correlative, one could hardly escape the con-
clusion that these decrees were based on statutes constantly and notori-
ously administered in an unconstitutional manner and therefore un-
constitutionalY If the Virgin Islands cannot make six weeks' pres-
ence within her borders merely prima facie evidence of domicile, it is
difficult to conceive of how Nevada can grant divorces on the basis of a
statute requiring six weeks' physical presence and nothing more. If the
saving grace of the Nevada practice is the sort of thing that made Mrs.
Hendrix's counsel ask her, "And that residence was an indefinite perma-
nent residence?" and made her answer yes, then the constitutionality of
statutes becomes conditioned upon the extent of perjury permitted by
the courts administering them.
CONSEQUENCES OF A REVERSAL
If the doctrine of the majority in the Alton case should eventually
be repudiated by higher authority, and if divorces of the Alton type
are granted in the future, as being in accordance with the requirements
of due process, there remains the question of the validity of the decrees
against collateral attack (or the question of full faith and credit) par-
ticularly by the state of original domicile in a prosecution for bigamy
or some similar offense if one of the parties should remarry. Whether
the rule of Johnson v. Muelberger,0 that parties not entitled to attack
a "normal" divorce in the state of rendition cannot attack it elsewhere,
bars such prosecution is an unresolved dilemma. Judge Goodrich ap-
parently thinks that it does not 57 but since a divorce obtained in com-
Transcript of Record, pp. 40-41, State v. Williams and Hendrix (II), 224 N.C.
x83, 29 S.E.zd 744 0944).
55Yick Wo v. Hopkins, uIS U.S. 356 (1886).
s o U . A 581 (695C).57 Cf. Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 674 ff. (3 d Cir. 1953).
[Voi. 4: SS
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pliance with Section 9a of the Virgin Islands act is presumably not sub-
ject to collateral challenge in the Virgin Islands by anyone, it would,
under a literal interpretation of the rule just stated, be immune to at-
tack by anybody in other jurisdictions. In this connection, it should be
noted that most convictions for bigamy, bigamous cohabitation and the
like, involving collateral attack on a foreign divorce, concern ex parte
divorces."'
There is, however, eminent, if not too recent, authority to the
effect that the state as the third party to the marriage cannot be pre-
cluded from asserting its continuing validity merely because the parties
themselves are precluded from so doing." The notion that the dom-
iciliary state has too intimate an interest in the marital status of its
citizens to permit their evading its laws by procuring divorces in other
jurisdictions might be too deeply rooted in legal thinking to be dis-
lodged without a major struggle. It is, to be sure, entirely illogical,
for the same states that jealously guard their right to refuse recognition
to foreign ex parte divorces recognize without question the evasion of
their own marriage laws by their citizens repairing abroad to procure
marriages they cannot obtain at home, be it because of affinity,60 or ju-
dicial decree."' But even if the Johnson rule is read subject to the ex-
8 Slansky v. State, 19z Md. 94, 63 A.zd 599 (1949); State v. Najjar, x N.J.
Super. zo, 63 A.2d 807 (94.9), aff'd, 2 N.J. 208, 66 A.2d 37 (i949)5 Reed v.
State, 148 Tex. Cr. 409, 187 S.W.2d 66o (i944.) , State v. Westmoreland, 76 S.C. 145 ,
56 S.E. 673 (907); State v. Armington, 25 Minn. 29 (1878) ; People v. Baker, 76
N.Y. 78 (1879) ; Hood v. State, 56 Ind. z63, z69-270 (1877). The latter case seems
to mark the premiere of mail order divorces5 the one impeached was rendered by Utah.
The court said: "The divorce manifestly was granted in violation of the sovereignty and
jurisdiction of another state, and in violation of the plainest principles of international
and constitutional law."
" People v. Dawell, 25 Mich. 246 (1872), by Judge Thomas Cooley. This is a 2
to i decision upholding defendant's conviction for bigamy, although his W-r had
obtained an Indiana divorce from him and he had appeared. Both defendant and W-r
were found to be residents of Michigan by the Michigan trial court. As Judge Cooley
tersely expressed the issue: "Does the State of Michigan establish and control the do-
mestic relations of its own citizens, or do they exist and continue only at the discretion
of the inferior courts of another State?" Id. at 253. Campbell, J., dissenting, thought
that the Indiana decree should be entitled to full faith and credit. Id. at 265 ff.
"0In re May's Estate, 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953): decedent had married
his half-niece in Rhode Island, where such marriage was legal, and lived with her
in New York, where it was not. Held: the marriage celebrated in Rhode Island, if
valid there, is valid in New York, too.
"
1Fisher v. Fisher, z5o N.Y. 313, 165 N.E. 46o (x929): H had been the guilty
party in a New York divorce proceeding; and the decree prohibited his remarriage
while his wife was still alive. He nevertheless remarried in another jurisdiction (to
wit, on board a ship, 40 miles out from the port of New York). In an action for
separation by his second wife, held, the second marriage is valid.
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ception that the state of original domicile is not barred from asserting
the validity of the original marriage by collaterally attacking the di-
vorce on jurisdictional grounds, although everybody else is precluded
from so doing, it might be worth noting that in the present case, such
prosecution would not be possible if the remarrying party remarried in
the Virgin Islands. 2 Furthermore, as has been pointed out in con-
nection with the Williams cases, the mere possibility of subsequent suc-
cessful collateral attack would not impugn the constitutionality of the
original decree in the state of rendition, but merely its claim to full
faith and credit in the attacking jurisdiction. For all we know, Mr.
Williams and Mrs. Hendrix are still validly married in Nevada.
CONSENSUAL DIVORCE AND DUE PRocEss
Even if the basic premises of the majority opinion in Alton v. Alton
are granted, there remains one curious difficulty which does not seem
to have been convincingly overcome. Suppose that the statute does
violate the due process clause. Who is being deprived of due process?
H, we take it, is not complaining; he did not argue in support of the
decision which in fiction went in his favor when W appealed from it.
Even if H were actually complaining, it might be of interest to ascertain
if he is being deprived of "life" (certainly not); "qiberty" (which is
being restored to him as well as to W); or "property." Obviously, it
could only be the last, a startling thought in this day and age. It might
safely be predicted that no court will now hold that a husband has a
property interest in his wife within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment; and as to the property interest of the wife in the continuation
of the marital nexus, the Supreme Court has held that the latter is not
suspended even by a valid ex parte divorce. 63
In attempting to bring the statutory divorce procedure of the Vir-
gin Islands within the purview of the due process clause, Judge Good-
rich, fully cognizant of the difficulty of protecting by that clause some-
2 3 GEN. STAT. CONN. § 8546 (1949): "Any person who shall marry another,
if either be then lawfully married, or shall vnarry in another state or country in viola.
tion of the laws thereof, and shall knowingly cohabit and live with such other in this
state as husband and wife, shall be imprisoned not more than five years" (emphasis
added). Connecticut does not have a "strong" public policy against migratory di-
vorces; it has traditionally both granted and recognized ex parte decrees. See Haddock
v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 56z (19o6) 5 Gildersleeve v. Gildersleeve, 88 Conn. 689, 92
At. 684 (1914). It does, however, fully permit collateral attacks on such foreign
divorce decrees. Rice v. Rice, 134 Conn. 440, 58 A.2d 523, 527 (948), aft'd, 336
U.S. 674 (1949) 5 Santangelo v. Santangelo, 137 Conn. 404, 78 A.2d 245, 246 (95!),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 927 (1951); State v. Cooke, iio Conn. 348, 148 At. 385
(i9lo). The last case involved a prosecution for nonsupport.
3 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
[Voi. 4: 55
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one who does not want to be so protected, suggests that the case is
analogous to an attempt to confer jurisdiction over collision at sea on a
state court in the absence of objection."4 The analogy seems to be some-
what incomplete, since conferring admiralty jurisdiction on an inland
state would not violate the due process clause, but would violate specific
mandates in other sections of the Constitution and acts of Congress en-
acted in accordance therewith.65
Yet, there conceivably is one way of making out a case for deprival
of something without due process of law in the Alton case. That would
be that the parties, in collusion with each other, deprive the state of
Connecticut of its right to regulate their marital status. On a larger
scale, it would also be the deprivation of the state of domiciliary origin
of its right to prosecute for bigamy and like offenses those who, by col-
lusively invading more liberal jurisdictions, obtain a quick release from
marital bonds good against the whole world under the Johnson rule
and then, having found greener pastures, marry other parties and return
home. But the various due process clauses protect only persons,66 not
states. Whether a dictum in a recent case that "The people of the
State are also entitled to due process of law' 6 7 really means that, just
as corporations were held to be persons within the purview of the due
process clauses,"" states will now also be considered as persons, seems to
be a totally unresolved, and even less interesting, question. For in cases
like Alton v. Alton, states would be denied "due process" because the
Constitution requires them to extend full faith and credit-an impossible
construction.
Thus the outcome is a series of paradoxes:
(i) If the decree had been granted in the Alton case, it would
have, been entitled to full faith and credit under the Constitution, but
the law under which it was sought is held to be unconstitutional because
it violates the due process clause.
"Alton v. Alton, 207 F.zd 667, 677 ( 3 d Cir. 1953).
05 U.S. CONST. A.T. III, § 2: "The judicial Power shall extend . .. to all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (Supp. 1952): "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of
... [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." The construction of the latter so-called
"saving clause" seems to be that federal jurisdiction in rein is exclusive while the state
can exercise jurisdiction over in personam actions as long as they do not change sub-
stantive maritime law. Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 56o-561 (-954) ,
ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY § 4, 22-24- (1939).
" Cf. note 8 supra.
" Stein v. New York, 34.6 U.S. x56, 197 (1953).
" The first case to so hold was Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 1iIS
U.s. 394, 396 (1886).
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(2) Neither party attacks the law on that basis; and both would
be very happy if the decree were granted. Nevertheless, someone is
being deprived of due process.
(3) If the state of domiciliary origin can prosecute H and W
for bigamy if they should remarry other parties and return home, it is
not being deprived of due process. If it cannot so prosecute them, the
processes available to it for the regulation of the marital status of its
domiciliaries will be seriously curtailed, but that will be because ... the




9Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 589 (195).
